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This paper brings together phenomenology and a kind of reader-response 
criticism in order to explicate E.B. White’s famous children’s novel, 
Charlotte’s Web. The paper has three main parts. In the first, the paper 
highlights some important themes of Edmund Husserl’s work – i.e. 
perception, intersubjectivity, and temporality. In the second part, the paper 
relates the author’s act of reading the novel together with a young child, 
the author’s daughter, and foregrounds her own responses to the text. In 
the third, the paper presents what the author takes to be a new reading of 
White’s story by means of both the conversation with the child and the 
previously presented phenomenological concepts. In addition, the paper 
intersects with insights of the Philosophy for Children movement and with 
the development of its narrative of a community of inquiry.
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Introduction
In Philosophy in the Classroom, Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and 
Frederick S. Oscanyon argue, with a child’s moral education specifically in mind, 
the following (2010: 204, emphasis in the original):
14
the self at any one time is always in the process of transition, contingent upon the 
means that are available to us to achieve the goals that are sought. Thus, the availability 
of means conditions and modifies our ideals and objectives, just as, conversely, the 
ends we have in view control the way we search for means to employ and the selves 
we are in the process of becoming. 
This process of transition is something that the authors note about selves in 
general – without a distinction between child and adult. Each human self, in this 
view, is more determined by its movement than by its points of departure and arrival. 
This transitional status of all selves is an important point to be unpacked, and I will 
spend the rest of this introduction attempting such an unpacking.
As a good deal of current research in children and education and children’s 
literature shows, children are not little versions of adults. They are not transitional 
in the sense of lacking development, as being on the way to “us”, as it were. To 
see children as undeveloped adults would be to commit oneself to the fallacy of 
developmentalism, more useful for categorizing and disciplining those without 
immediate credentials to power than to listening, understanding and interacting. 
In fact, were we to think of children as undeveloped adults, who were simply 
making linear moves of transition into adulthood, we would also compromise 
our own self-understanding. For Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyon (2010), the self 
is transitional as such. There is no static, developed “self”, no endpoint, that 
determines adults either. On the contrary, adults cannot authentically maintain a 
sense of having “made it” or developed sufficiently that can allow them to stop 
being active, creative readers of each other or texts. 
If adults are certain that they have fully understood a person or a text without 
further ado, then they are stuck – not well-developed or mature. For those who 
are certain, the self-reflection into their own “stuck” process of becoming can 
only come within the inevitable arrival of a painful, and ultimately unnecessarily 
painful, conflict of interpretations. 
We can do real harm, therefore, not only to children but also to ourselves, 
if we attempt to construe what we experience in terms of an arbitrary, perhaps 
binary, system of categories. To put this point another way: we can prevent our own 
“process of becoming” if we do not develop the kind of supple perceptions or acts 
of reading that answer not to ourselves alone but to the plurality of experiences that 
demands to be described together with our own.
In contrast with the previous, stuck vision of certainty that I have been 
describing, stands the possibility of a more flexible perception, the possibility of 
seeing each self as defined by a process of transition, of evolutionary movement. To 
see oneself as this “process of becoming” is to liberate oneself for the kind of active, 
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creative moments of perception or “reading” that can draw a larger community to 
notice its own plurality and rich possibilities for further, shared work. 
How did I miss that interpretation? Who do I have to become in order to hear 
that text or that music as emotionally moving? – These are the kinds of questions 
we become open to when we see movement, and not development, as the definition 
of a self. And thus, to highlight the notion of transition as the metaphysical lynchpin 
of humanity is productive – it allows us to see how many selves we might call on 
to help us flesh out our shared world. 
To return to the quote from Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyon above, we can see 
that a focus on transition allows us also to notice the following two things: first, we 
see that we are already answering to our own multi-dimensional temporal structure. 
We are not simply on a linear, one-directional timeline. Rather, we are, even now, 
dwelling within the persons we were and anticipating the persons we will become. 
We are constantly moving into the past and future, and we are constantly readjusting 
the way our past and future selves define and matter to us now. 
We are therefore never really fully or only here and now. We are never fully 
this present self. Rather, we are moving into and out of a plurality of moments, a 
plurality of selves within the present moment. We are, in effect, always spreading 
ourselves out backwards and forwards. This means that, far from a simple linear 
motion, our transitions from present to past and future have the shape of a multi-
dimensional zigzag, as we go back and forth from our present selves. Speaking 
phenomenologically, each self is “ecstatic” in its movement, always moving 
outside of itself, dancing with other versions of itself, combining with and letting 
go of them in various styles of living. 
Second, we see that our transitional self is precisely capable of – one might 
almost say designed for – attending to our places and possible roles in a shared 
situation. That is, referring back again to the quote from Lipman, Sharp and 
Oscanyon, we see that we are called to move as transitional selves between means 
and ends, in a zigzag fashion. We are called, therefore, to negotiate a shared world 
because each of us is one among many transitional selves who are all confronted 
together by larger situations with scarce resources. In short, we see that we share 
the world and each situation of our living with others, and, because of that, we are 
called to deploy our transitional movement between the means and ends of our own 
choices.
 Our transitional structure thus points us to the inherent morality of shared 
life. We are a process of becoming. But so is the world, and so are our situations 
within it. Moreover, these processes (ourselves, the world, situations) gear into one 
another and require our careful, attentive, moral response. Because we are capable 
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of multi-dimensional movement, then, we are also capable of multi-dimensional 
perception and action that is called for by this world. We can and (implicitly, since 
we are always already in the world) we must deploy our rich selves towards the 
becoming of the world. We can and we must continuously reconnoitre and redefine 
both means and ends. 
We are a process of becoming, in short, in order to answer to what this world, 
what this situation, is itself becoming around us. And so the notion of transition is 
thus triply important: 1) we move within our temporality; 2) we move within the 
limits of situations in which we find ourselves to be ensconced; 3) the world or the 
situation itself moves around us as do the others who share it with us. To remain 
caught in the notion of static development, to refuse to see transition as the key 
notion to human experience, is to become stuck or lost in oneself or in a situation, 
in a world, that is changing around us and calling for a changing, supple act of 
perception, of “reading.”
Indeed, I use that word “reading” intentionally. Perhaps most noticeably we 
exist as our transitional, moving selves in the act of reading a book – a novel like 
E.B. White’s Charlotte’s Web, say. For in the act of reading we slip from the person 
who we are into the persons of the characters, into the situations of the book. And 
so, when reading and responding to texts, we practice a particularly concrete zigzag 
of self-movement and self-formation. 
This act of reading has a typical structure. A particular book like White’s 
Charlotte’s Web moves us, perhaps. We identify with its characters, and we develop 
a way of processing its key moments. The room has faded in the background, and 
our bearings have shifted. Where have we gone? Who are we? These questions are 
difficult to answer when we are ensconced in the book. Afterwards, when we talk 
about our reading with others, we come to see, perhaps for the first time, who we 
have been, what we have noticed. We may also see that our reading can come – 
indeed must come – into conflict with another’s. 
In the case of such conflict, finding that ours is not the only interpretative 
stance, we may (productively) feel compelled to return to the text again. We know 
we can do so, since the other person has already done it to a different end, and we 
may well desire to do so in order to become the person who can navigate multiple 
possible (and actual) responses to this same text. We learn, in the case of such 
conflict, that we can return to the process of self-formation in reading in order to 
re-engage the formation of a response. 
In our re-vision, we see perhaps what we had not seen before. We see what 
allowed the other to see the book that way, and we see that the text has a multiplicity 
of openings to a variety of selves, selves who can each take up the same text 
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differently as “means to employ” their own action in the description of a larger, 
shared world. 
To re-view what it means to read by reading again is to find oneself in a 
laboratory, perhaps. A laboratory that demands, as it were, that one be more or less 
pleasantly engaged with a multi-layered text, a text that seems in the end to be as 
transitional as oneself is.
This novel, this story, that captured our attention gives its ending to us, 
perhaps, as a moment of sadness. Who am I leaving behind at the end of the story? 
Why cannot I continue to be who I was within the act of reading? This text, if it 
moves us in these ways, does not simply develop or unfold its static self. Rather, 
it moves (and it moves us) in a kind of evolution of interpretations, each of which 
both preserves and outstrips the others as the text lives its transitional life through 
us, its readers.
We are transitional selves. We take up a book as one of the means and ends 
that assist our “process of becoming.” But the text too is transitional. It reads itself 
into us. It takes us up and encodes our process with its own. Who is thinking in us 
when we read? The text? Or our own selves? Perhaps it is too binary to try to place 
the power or the blame on one or the other.
Scholarly placement and an outline of the argument
As may perhaps already be implicit in its introduction, this paper will take 
up the following research question: How does E.B. White’s novel Charlotte’s Web 
demonstrate a phenomenological account of transition as central to the description 
of human experience?
Answering this question will involve two main explorations: first, that of 
Edmund Husserl’s account of transition as an emblematic of phenomenological 
description of human experience; and second, that of the manner in which one child 
demonstrated Husserl’s insights within her process of reading E.B. White’s novel, 
Charlotte’s Web. My own comments will be presented as further explications of the 
child’s insights, i.e. possible expansions on the way the child/reader worked with 
the novel so as to synthesize the transitional selves within the novel (the selves of 
Charlotte, Wilbur, Fern, etc.) with her own transitional self. 
This approach is somewhat new, as I choose phenomenology and a particular 
child’s reading experience, i.e., that of our then seven-year-old daughter, as the two 
foci of the paper. But I do this so as to highlight what the Philosophy for Children 
movement might call the importance of treating children as co-interlocutors along 
the shared path of meaningful description of experience.
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Though I believe the paper’s argument is rather novel, I do readily acknowledge 
that it resonates with (and indeed utilizes) the work of a number of scholars in 
children’s literature, in education, in philosophy for children (as the initial quote 
from Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyon shows), and in literary theory. I will here try 
to give a sense of the debt I owe these other scholars and fields insofar as I try to 
combine our shared commitments to a new reading.
First, I acknowledge a debt to literary theory. In an early text on narrative, 
Michael J. Toolan argues that “behind their seeming simplicity and playfulness, 
stories for and by children are, on closer consideration, remarkably complex and an 
aid to an index of the interactional and cognitive development of the child” (1988: 
215). I carry that characterization of stories as “aid” and “index” forward with the 
description of the self in transition in Philosophy in the Classroom (Lipman, Sharp 
& Oscanyon 2010), as I move toward a kind of phenomenological description. 
Second, I acknowledge that many educational scholars, such as Sylvia Pantaleo, 
among others, have already taken children’s responses seriously. For Pantaleo, 
what is at stake in children’s reading is not only individual development but “social 
intertextuality” such that “aesthetic pleasure” in the act of reading, particularly 
picturebooks, comes hand in hand with “a sense of agency as a result of their 
recognition and application of the sophisticated literary devices they learned about 
through reading and discussing the picturebooks” (2008: 31, my emphasis). What 
Pantaleo talks about in picturebooks, I think, can also be extended to children’s 
novels, such as White’s. 
But this “agency”, resulting from the responses generated, it would seem, has 
its careful delimiters within the discipline of education. Barbara Kieffer, as one 
salient voice, cautions us that “children no matter what their age will respond to a 
story on their own terms of understanding” (2009: 53). By mentioning this notion 
of “on their own terms” she seems to mean that philosophers ought to respect the 
limits that the child displays: “it does little good (and can be destructive of the 
enjoyment of literature) if younger children are pushed to try to formulate the 
abstractions achieved by more mature children” (ibid.). So we should not prompt, 
not push, the child towards the movement that we call agency.
Of course, what it means to “push” children and what kind of “enjoyment” 
children might be limited to may be the subject of some debate. The “terms of 
understanding” that a child evinces may be in fact, and I would argue are, able to 
be altered, fulfilled, drawn out, etc. in the act of talking respectfully with them. 
The shifting goals and means of a child’s reading, then, may not be configured as 
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“pushing” so much as dialectically unraveling, or philosophically explicating, what 
is implicit in the child’s own understanding as the child reads herself into the book.1
As phenomenologist Richard Lang argues, we all have a responsibility to 
reflect phenomenologically on our basic inhabiting, our home. This will never be 
easy: “contemplating the notion of inhabiting discloses our primitive alliance with 
the world and thereby unsettles the natural embeddedness and forgetfulness of 
human existence” (Lang 1985: 201). If we are “primitively allied” with the world, 
we have to move back and forth, transition, from ourselves to the world that has 
preceded and sustained us. We need to move back and forth from text to reader, 
from child to adult, from theory to experience. 
I use Lang here in order to show that the text is simply a microcosm, a situation, 
of the world. With the text too we have a “primitive alliance” that needs to be 
described over and over in order to “disclose” what we would rather forget. We 
need to be called again and again into describing ourselves as transitional.
It may be, then, that if I am asking our child and asking all of my own readers 
to reflect on a reader’s relationship to her “home” in books or on books as a 
phenomenological space of transition, a “door” in Lang’s sense – if I am doing that, 
then what I am arguing may well put educators in an uneasy mood. As I mentioned 
above, however, I am not really aligning myself with philosophy for children, with 
education, or with children’s literature scholars.
The focus of this paper is rather a scholarly explication of the role of transition 
in the child’s self and the role of transition in this particular novel, Charlotte’s Web, 
and a eulogy for what it offers to younger readers.2 But I hope also to persuade 
educators to think again about the ways in which young children might think 
through their engagements with texts.
The argument of the paper has the following outline: first, I will discuss in 
Husserlian phenomenology the role of transition in three areas – perception in 
general, time-consciousness, and the experience of other people. Second, I will 
discuss our daughter’s reading experience of White’s Charlotte’s Web. And third, I 
will apply phenomenological description to White’s novel in support and expansion 
of our daughter’s insights.
1 See David Morris: “what leads to understanding is not a purely theoretical process 
divorced from its object, but a pre-theoretical need to understand that is satisfied only by 
taking responsibility for the way in which the object is comprehended, which is possible 
only if the object itself is responsible to comprehension, if it works in such a way that 
probing it, questioning it, working with it, provokes responses that fit with our ability to 
comprehend” (2006: 416).
2 See especially Murris’s paper in which she “mobilizes a rethinking of what it means to 




My intention in this paper is for the reader to notice that even in the introduction 
and in the material on Husserl I am implicitly discussing the novel. Fern, as the 
main human character, for example, is precisely the kind of moral self that Lipman, 
Sharp, and Oscanyon talk about in the paragraph initially cited. My description of 
our daughter’s act of reading, as well as that of my own, are meant to show how the 
act of reading is itself a deployment of transition as phenomenologically conceived.
Self as transitional: toward Husserlian phenomenology
On the one hand, if we go back to the quote from Philosophy in the Classroom 
with which the paper began, we see that the self is transitional because the “means” 
to be an effective and stable self, the means to reach a set of goals, are limited. 
We need to wait to see what we will become, in other words, because the means 
we employ may not become available to us until later, if at all. We are transitional 
because we are moving between means and ends, like children with an allowance 
running back and forth through multiple stores for the most we can get for our small 
sum of money. Sadly, the quote implies, some of us just will not make it to a stable 
self, or to a satisfactory object of desire, because the means to do so were denied us.
On the other hand, the second sentence of the quoted material declares that, 
even absent the appropriate means, the self may still participate in its own becoming. 
And with hope we realize that, even a poor person, even an impoverished self 
without an allowance, who is bound for death as the spider Charlotte seems to be in 
the novel, can still legislate the tenor of its transitions. Where does this hope come 
from? What legitimates it? 
For Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyon, I surmise that the hope arises because the 
self recognizes that the availability or lack of appropriate means can “modify” 
ideals and objectives but can never fully undo them. There is something irreducible 
to the power of self-determined ends or goals. Even without the means to support 
them, our own choices structure our becoming and our very encounter with means 
as such. Charlotte the spider, for example, cannot accompany her children who are 
to be born out of her passing. Yet that does not undo her strength in creating her 
magnum opus – the egg sac which she entrusts to Wilbur the pig at the fair, after she 
has saved him from death one last time.
Like children, like Charlotte, we find out quickly what our allowance will 
“allow,” and we anticipate ourselves and our desires and disappointments in our 
response. For example, we may change our minds in terms of what we go to buy 
with our allowance so that our hearts are not broken. Or we may reckon with small 
disappointments and refuse to buy anything at all so that we can participate in a 
process of hoping for later, larger acquisitions. By virtue of our power in making 
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the move between ends and ourselves then, some of us will achieve moments of 
satisfaction and stability in terms of self and desired objects by means of changing 
the definitions of desire, self and stability.
Of course there are no guarantees that satisfaction or stability will ensue when 
a child receives an allowance. But the ethical tension that the allowance affords, 
this being in transition with respect to self, means, and ends, is something that 
phenomenology recognizes as indicating an important, structural truth of the self – 
namely, that a motion transition occurs within and makes possible all layers or acts 
of selfhood. Let us now move on to consider three of those layers of selfhood in 
Husserl’s descriptions: our involvement with things, our consciousness of internal 
time, and our experience of others.
Husserl on perception as a transitional zigzag: noesis and noema
Let us first consider the way the movement of transition is operative within 
our experience of perceived things. Husserl’s description of experience in his Ideas 
(1999), for example, notes that the perception of a table unfolds between two poles, 
the acts of perceiving the table (or noeses), and the appearances of the object, in 
this case the table, within those acts (or the noema). According to Husserl, then, 
the perceived table (the noema) only gives itself as a meaning we can recognize 
continuously by means of a never-ending “zigzag”3 back and forth between noesis 
and noema, between the way in which the subject discovers the object and the way 
in which the object solicits the subject.
In this sense, and perhaps here I take Husserl beyond what he explicitly said, 
the phenomenological description of experience really is the necessary motion back 
and forth between the poles that coalesce the self around them. Or, to put it bluntly, 
phenomenology describes the relationship between object and subject as the very 
establishment of the self in its ability to declare more or less stable positions.4 
3 Though the context of this quote comes from his Crisis of the European Sciences and 
concerns Husserl’s discussion of the methodology of phenomenology as a whole, I think 
it is apropos to the discussion of intentionality I am discussing here: “Thus we have no 
other choice than to proceed forward and backward in a zigzag pattern; the one must help 
the other in an interplay” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 359). N.B.: The source I have used 
for the citations from Husserl here and throughout the paper is an edited collection of his 
most important works in English. 
4 The following is from the Ideas: “A parallelism between noesis and noema is indeed 
the case, but it is such that one must describe the formations on both sides and in their 
essentially mutual correspondence” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 99, my emphasis). The 
transition imposed on the phenomenologist is thus the transition of “first one, then the 
other” that allows the full description to unfold, even as the noesis and noema area always 
already given together. This idea gets further taken up in Analyses of Passive and Active 
Synthesis where Husserl moves on from the necessary movement of explication to the 
transition within perception itself, the call of the object, through anticipation, to the 
responsive, noetic movement of embodied consciousness. See Husserl & Welton p. 223.
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But this correlation between subject and object in perception has deeper roots. 
Indeed, I believe that it is in Husserl’s description of time-consciousness, the second 
layer of subjectivity that I want to discuss, that he demonstrates how the correlation 
of our acts of perceiving with our perceived objects is guaranteed, passively, by our 
self-experience of our internal time.5 
Husserl on temporality: time as our process of becoming
The ability we have in the world to move back and forth from the object to our 
own subjectivity, from noema to noesis – our ability to notice the way that the object 
solicits and responds to our acts of perceiving – entails and utilizes the experience 
of our temporality itself. For it is this primordial layer of our experience, that of 
our basic or fundamental temporality, that is always unfolding as a transitional 
movement from moment to moment, a going over from one to the other, that 
somehow also gives us – in moving from one to the other – a continuity of our 
selves as wholes. 
Any continuity in our acts of motion, our “going over” from one thing to 
another, therefore depends on our enacting a more fundamental transition that is 
not simply a vacillation from point to point but rather a maintenance of the former 
within the latter. The flow of perception, the ongoing life we have as one and the 
same life, thus depends on the flow of internal time as the secretion and continuity 
of self-hood.
And, in fact, Husserl seems to argue just this in the Lectures, namely that we 
are whole selves because we experience ourselves as forming time within ourselves 
as a kind of passive synthesis. For him, this self-experience is not one of an act we 
perform consciously. The fact that we “produce” time for our own self-experience is 
clear. But the way we produce time is, in a word, a secret. We cannot catch ourselves 
pushing out temporality in the way we can see a spider spinning a web or in the way 
we know that we are throwing a ball or walking around a table when we do so. Yet 
we can experience how this flow of time really is the grounding of the continuity of 
5 Husserl himself notes something of this kind also in the Ideas. There, in sections 41 and 42, he 
describes the way in which the adumbrations or slices of the noema (for example, the sides of 
the perceived table) belong together as a particular kind of multiplicity. But he notes that this 
adumbrated multiplicity of the table, while complementing and correlating with the noetic 
multiplicity of acts, is a dependent form of unity. The adumbrations in their unity depend on time-
consciousness and its different species of unity in order for the perception of each adumbration to 
unfold as an adumbration of the same table. For the table to be perceived as a whole, therefore, 
my time-consciousness must contain my multiple acts of perceiving within me in a different way 
than each adumbration sketches out the rest of the table. Two sentences from these sections are 
helpful to note here. First, this: “A mental process [Erlebnis] is not adumbrated” (Husserl & Welton 
1999: 73). And then, this: “The perception itself, however, is what it is in the continuous flux of 
consciousness and is itself a continuous flux; continually the perceptual Now changes into the 
enduring consciousness of the Just-Past and simultaneously a new Now lights up, etc.” (71).
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our experience and how it must be we who are doing it: “This flow is something we 
speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not something in objective 
time. It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to 
be designated metaphorically as flow […]. In the actuality-experience we have 
the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation” (Husserl 
& Welton 1999: 213, emphasis in the original). We produce a flow of time as a 
spider does of a web. It is our doing. And yet, we cannot return to the origin of this 
becoming. There is a limit to our reflection on ourselves. We are simply cast upon 
the ocean, the flow, of our own becoming.
What we can notice, however, by means of this limitation on our reflection, is 
that our perceptions of objects, of world, of others, depend on our temporality. The 
transition from object to object, from adumbration to adumbration, or from object 
to subject – the “allowance” of our perceptual lives – depends on a transition that 
underlies it that makes it possible to hold on to what is just past in the passing over 
to the new. Like a child who receives an allowance from an adult, we receive our 
allowance as the purpose of our temporality. We move between moments in order 
to move between objects and ourselves.
By virtue of the transition, the flow, the continuity of time, we are transitional, 
but not as fish are. We do not make a turn and forget what we have just left behind. 
Rather, within our transition, the fact of our transition matters to us. We live through 
our transitions from subject to object, from other to self, because we are always 
already living through the moments that connect them.
We see, as we move, that what has come before is somehow, to varying 
degrees and in varying ways, implicit in what is now. Life is the perceptual process 
of fleshing out what temporality means. To read a book, for example, is to see how 
the unfolding of a text across the time of reading it becomes possible, desirable, etc. 
Like the understanding or reading of a text, or even the sides of a house as we walk 
around it, we too are given to ourselves as the same even as we proceed in transition 
from moment to moment.
If I can further Husserl’s metaphor on the flow and transition of temporality, 
I think it is as though each of us were a spider spinning a web from out of herself 
without being conscious as to how this thread of “absolute subjectivity” or how this 
continuity occurred by means of our movement. We can sense it. We can experience 
the ease with which we make our own the transition between present perception, 
memory, expectation, imagination, and so forth. But we do not know how.
With Husserl, then, what we come to see is that, if we were not transition with 
continuity all the way down – if our own temporality did not ground and found 
our perception – well, then no other relationship, and certainly no relationship of 
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noesis and noema, could ever emerge.6 For the very establishing of relationships 
is predicated on the ability we have to retain some commonality, some common 
thread, between the poles. This achievement is possible only because of the very 
fact that the present moment in our self-experience, indeed any and every moment 
no matter what that moment is concerned with in terms of content, is biting onto the 
just past and the just future.7
And, finally, let us consider the motion of transition implicit within the third 
layer of subjectivity, a motion which intersects with both the motions of perception 
and temporality. This third layer is that of other people.
Husserl on the experience of other people
Husserl’s description of our experience of others, intersubjectivity, shows how 
we are paired with others as a passive whole that grounds our differences. Our what 
he calls “pairing”, a reciprocity of multiple acts of perception, allows us to move in 
a kind of zig-zag, in which each of us within the pair can care how we appear to the 
other on the basis of our always already pre-given relationship. 
This pre-given pairing relationship, which is always already given and 
established as more than the sum of us as members or parts, thus guarantees, just as 
the absolute subjectivity of the temporal flow did, the continuity of our experience. 
Our life with others is given as a continuity; they matter to us and remain with us 
even as we contemplate ourselves. This continuity, while not removing the anxiety 
or danger that can confront us within the experience of the other as other, means 
that our relations with others are capable of revealing more about the world and 
about our relationship as we transition from self to other, from self to relation, from 
my view on you to yours on me, etc.8
6 “The now, for its part, requires its own moment of origin for its constitution. These moments are 
continuously united in the succession; they ‘pass over into one another continuously.’ The transition 
is mediated qualitatively and also temporally” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 211, my emphasis). The 
now is thus able to originate because it is the process of transition towards itself out of the now 
that it was emerging out of. The now is the gift of a transition that does not pause to admire its 
handiwork. See also Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (2013: 446ff). 
7 In fact, in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl puts the relation between 
noesis and noema specifically in terms of transition: “let us now take a look at the formation of 
unity […] by examining the transition of appearances, for instance, when approaching or walking 
around an object or in eye movement. The fundamental relationship in this dynamic transition is 
that of intention and fulfillment. The empty pointing ahead acquires its corresponding fullness. 
It corresponds roughly to the rich possibilities prefigured; but since its nature is determinable 
indeterminacy, it also brings, together with the fulfillment, a closer determination” (Husserl & 
Welton 1999: 226, my emphasis). The synthesis of fulfillment is a particular concretion of the 
synthesis of internal time by means of absolute subjectivity.
8 “It [the Other person] brings to mind the way my body would look ‘if I were there.’ In this case 
too although the awakening does not become a memory intuition, pairing takes place. The first-
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It is ironic, in one way, that the relation by which we are paired with others, 
by which we perceive them, is, like our internal time, accomplished passively. 
Sometimes it seems so necessary that it be otherwise. We seem so determined to 
choose reflectively those with whom we would dwell. And yet, as in the act of 
reading, we time and time again find ourselves committed to others, even to the 
smallest of gestures, like a smile we return to a smiling face in a commercial, before 
we realize what we are doing, before we realize the smile is about dish detergent, say.
As far as the pairing with others goes, though, even in the midst of a response 
that catches us unaware, there is no doubt that the response is ours. We certainly 
performed it; and we cannot argue the contrary of this statement very confidently: 
our seeing the other as meaningful is always already at least in part our responsibility. 
And yet often we cannot, for all that admission of responsibility, bring to 
view the moment we “decided” to see another as meaningful. Instead we feel the 
structural truth that Husserl identifies as the very motion of pairing: “a certain 
mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum 
‘primordial world’ […] and making present to consciousness a ‘there too’ […]. We 
have here, accordingly, a kind of making co-present” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 146, 
my emphasis). Seeing the other as other, then, involves us in a passive transition, a 
“going out from” and a going across to them, that is “mediated” and yet our own. 
And this mediated immediacy should recall our own time-consciousness.
In fact, as Husserl discusses in section 51 of Cartesian Meditations, our 
relationship with others, a relationship to which we awaken after it starts, and in 
which we find ourselves given, is still a “primal form of that passive synthesis 
which we designate as association” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 148). We do not enact 
it with our self-consciousness.
There is a transitional motion to our relationships, then, which as passive 
recalls our time-consciousness, and which we do as if behind our own backs, as it 
were.9 Husserl describes this passive synthesis in several ways: on the one hand as 
“an intentional overreaching” and on the other hand as “living mutual awakening 
and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other” (Husserl & Welton 
awakened manner of appearance of my body is not the only thing that enters into a pairing; my 
body itself does so likewise” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 151). I have argued elsewhere that the 
subjunctive nature of the pairing experience makes rather explicit the function of transition within 
both the experience of pairing and the process of explicating it (Costello 2012). That my whole 
body, and not just the “take” I have on my body in this or that moment, is involved in pairing with 
the Other means that I must go forth and seek out the further significances of my always already 
established involvement with the Other, who has, as if behind my back, already gained access to 
my own significance.
9 See also Husserl’s famous discussion of the instructional analogy of intersubjectivity and time-
consciousness in section 53: “Somewhat as my memorial past […] transcends my present, the 
appresented other being transcends my own being” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 150).
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1999: 148). There is both our own responsibility (intentional overreaching) and our 
passive participation (mutual awakening) in our relationship with others.
The motion and continuity of transition – as demonstrated in both our 
experience of internal time and of the correlation between noema and noesis – is 
therefore given again in the face of the other person as doubled in its totality. What 
we noted within our consciousness, we do as a whole with another. 
In a sense, then, the other and oneself are transitional moments of a larger time-
flow, that of our relationship. We might feel the time of each relationship differently. 
We might say that relationships take us for a ride or have their plans for us. In saying 
things like that we mean that the motion of transition that is our own is thus situated 
within a transitional relationship of our whole selves toward those of others.
Because this largest sense of transition, the third and most powerful of this 
nested series of transitions, is true – because we are transitioning beings that are 
themselves within a unity of transition with other transitioning beings – we can 
note with Husserl that every noema, and even our selves, are subject to “a mutual 
transfer of sense” (Husserl & Welton 1999: 148, my emphasis).
As phenomenologically initiated into the motion of transition, then, we are 
given an opportunity to see how we are always in process. We are always between 
or toward objects, time, and other people. This may mean, if we take Husserl’s 
descriptions seriously, that it would be worthwhile to look and see if noticing others 
making transitions made a difference in our own self-process. Perhaps in finding 
others’ transitional processes we can learn about how to guide ourselves towards 
means and ends.
Reading and discussing Charlotte’s Web with a seven-year-old
What I’d like to do for the remaining portion of this paper, then, is to build off 
of this brief introduction of Husserl on the notion of transition toward a reading of 
E.B. White’s famous story Charlotte’s Web. I’d like to do this both as an unfolding 
of White’s book and as a contribution to a phenomenological description of human 
experience. For ultimately what I think one finds in the story is an important 
meditation on how the transitions of selfhood are generative, and grounding, for a 
more adequate, more explicit life as human experiencers.
In writing this paper, I talked about Charlotte’s Web with our daughter, who 
at age seven was slightly younger than the main character, Fern, at the time of 
our discussion. I had not divulged what I was thinking about the book with her, 
even though I was already certain that I would write on transition in the story, 
specifically with respect to the way in which the webs and the words that Charlotte 
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wrote in them, occupied a kind of transitional status and space in the experience of 
those who saw and read them. 
I only asked her the question that I ask all of my undergraduate students in 
upper-division courses in phenomenology: what did you get out of the book? 
Our daughter was put off by this question at first, perhaps because of its 
generality. Instead, she said, she preferred to discuss each of the characters in turn. 
When I asked her about Fern, the main girl in the book, our daughter said that “Fern 
was kind in the beginning. But she let it go and wanted someone else. The story 
shows people can change and not always stay the same. She wanted Henry [the boy 
she rides the ferris wheel with at the fair].”10
I thought for a moment about our daughter’s initial comment. She reminded 
me that Fern, a girl in some ways like our daughter, does in fact begin the story 
with what might be called an act of kindness. She prevents her father from killing 
Wilbur, the runt of a litter of pigs. In return for her generosity, her father provides 
her with the opportunity for an apprenticeship in care by giving her the very pig 
himself.
But I was wondering what it meant for Fern to let go of the axe and pick up 
the pig, and then what it meant for Fern to let go of the project of caring for the pig 
and start caring for the boy Henry. I wondered where our daughter would go later in 
her own life, which projects she would let go of. So I followed up with her on this 
initial offering and asked her what “it” meant when she said Fern “let it go.” Our 
daughter replied that “Fern learned that she thought she’d love the pig forever. But 
then she learned she changed and didn’t want Wilbur anymore.”
There was a lot to support our daughter’s reading, I realized. Fern’s care very 
quickly bumps up against its limitations, as Wilbur almost overnight grows too 
big for the doll’s cradle and carriage that Fern initially keeps him in. When this 
happens, Fern’s care, at the insistence of her family, becomes a care that is shared 
with others, especially other animals. Wilbur is placed in a barnyard on her aunt 
and uncle’s farm some distance away. In fact, I thought, that shift in the site of care 
for Wilbur might be an important factor in the way Fern relates to her own project 
of being with him.
Thinking all this, I asked our daughter more about what she saw as the “change” 
in Fern. What did that mean to her that Fern not only changed but was aware that 
she had changed. She said she was “disappointed in Fern”, even though she thought 
that “Fern did some kind, brave, and generous things.”




I became intrigued again. It seemed to me that our daughter was following 
the thread of Fern’s relationship with Wilbur particularly closely, especially since 
she had read the book only once and then quite quickly, in one or two sittings. I 
could not help but notice, however, that she was right. In enacting the move toward 
Wilbur’s new home, Fern herself changed or at least her perceptions did. Her 
attention to Wilbur became attention to Wilbur’s surroundings, his friends, and then 
the situation in which Wilbur was placed and the relationships he had to the whole 
community who came to look at him. Being engaged in a project, then, could help 
Fern project herself beyond herself, much like the act of reading might help young 
(and older) readers.
I then asked our daughter what the point of doing “kind, brave and generous 
things” were if Fern changed and stopped doing them. I also rephrased the question 
after a quizzical look from her and asked what she thought the point of Fern 
changing was. She replied that “Fern taught the animals that you can’t always stay 
the same. But at the same time she was sort of teaching that to herself.”
I was silent a moment. Had Fern “taught the animals”? I remembered the times 
that Fern listened in the barnyard to the conversations that the animals had with each 
other, particularly those concerning the attempts at saving Wilbur from becoming 
so much ham and bacon. But she does not speak directly to them, the way a teacher 
might do to an ethics class. Could our daughter have been incorrect? Perhaps. But 
perhaps the “teaching” that Fern did was more about the act of dwelling with the 
animals, of listening to and perceiving with them. Perhaps Fern’s teaching came 
in the process of moving into and out of the barnyard and the home, setting an 
example to follow by way of contemplating “some pig.”
At this point of our conversation, which was interspersed with some silent 
reflection on both our parts and which lasted on the whole about 20 minutes, I 
thought I saw her tiring of her father. So, finally, I asked her what her favorite part 
of the story was. Our daughter said that her favorite part was “when Wilbur and 
Charlotte talk to each other in those few sessions, and Wilbur gets more and more 
disappointed that he would lose his friend in the end. Bitter tenderness.”
I had forgotten the intimate conversations that accompanied the three or four 
times (depending on how one counts) that Charlotte makes webs for Wilbur. I had 
forgotten how she and Wilbur talked about what she would create for him within 
them, whether it was a word or a magnum opus. I forgot her engagement with him 
in the process of writing for and to him. How had I forgotten that, I wondered?
As our daughter was saying all these things, as well as more that I have not 
woven into this paper, I knew that I had to continue working through the notion 
of transition in the story. It wasn’t just the transitional objects, Charlotte’s webs, 
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that appeared in the story. It was the movement of Fern herself, and perhaps of her 
family, that needed to be further explicated. It was also the relationships between 
two communities of philosophical inquiry – the animals and the humans – that 
needed further explication, and the transitions between them within the story as a 
whole.
I was intrigued, too, by the way our daughter had referred to Wilbur and 
Charlotte’s conversations as “sessions”, reminding me of Fern’s mother meeting the 
psychiatrist, who assured the mother that Fern would change. And so I wondered 
about how sharing mortality can bring on a transition to “bitter tenderness.”
A critical reading of Charlotte’s Web in the light of a seven-year-
old’s response
Gareth Matthews (1994) has written about how Charlotte’s Web is an important 
story for children who are facing mortality, either in their own lives or in the lives 
of the people they care about.11 One can immediately see the truth of that in the 
story. The whole reason for Charlotte’s project of writing is to save Wilbur’s life. 
The threat of death looms over the book from beginning to end.
But there is more than a literal death of an animal to contend with. At the 
very beginning, Fern grabs her father’s axe and declares that she sees no difference 
between herself and the pig. Her father’s willingness to kill the one signals the 
willingness to kill the other. This assertion means a great deal.
It disrupts the normal binary categories. Fern is reading herself into Wilbur’s 
position, and the axe, as the messenger that we are transitioning from living being 
to a function of a farm, poises itself as the space between reading and living. The 
axe, as Derrida (2009) might say, makes a cut.
In disrupting their categories by her reading herself into Wilbur’s situation, 
Fern forces her family to reappropriate their tradition. How have the boundaries 
between object and subject, subject and subject, animal and human come to be 
established? Are they legitimate? How have the boundaries and laws of family 
life come to be established? Are they legitimate? The family must, to paraphrase 
Augustine, take up the book and read – again. For a new reading is showing itself, 
one unanticipated within this pre-existing family that thought that all of its members 
were one and the same in the manner in which their perceptions flowed.
Fern’s act of reading herself into Wilbur, then, means that death, but not only 
death, looms over this story. Madness does, too; of the kind that always threatens 
11 “Charlotte’s Web […] enjoys a special place in the lives of many children battling terminal illness, as 
Myra Bluebond-Langner reports in her pioneering work on leukemic children” (Matthews 1994: 92).
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us when we read Derrida’s work, particularly The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(2009).12
In the face of Fern moving toward spending time with the animals in the barn 
and listening to them, her mother is unsettled. Who is this girl becoming? What 
is Fern’s reading of Fern herself, as she moves into the community of the barn, 
likely to produce in her, in her mother, in the family? Certainly, Fern’s mother 
becomes unsettled, perhaps in terms of how she perceives the category and essence 
of “child.” And it is thus, in the face of madness, that Fern’s mother goes toward a 
psychiatrist, Dr. Dorian.
But madness does not just end at the bounds of the family farm. Fern’s 
neighbors and friends, especially Lurvy and the pastor, are also unsettled. For 
them, the unsettling madness occurs by way of Charlotte’s webs and the words 
that are woven into them. The pastor especially is unsettled by the way authorship 
and writing removes the author from view. And so he and Lurvy together read 
themselves into the web as into a religious text, moving toward faith in miracles.
Their transitions, which come by means of staring at the web and forgetting 
the spider, make their act of reading into the web a kind of forgetting. For they 
forget the difference between nature and culture in their move into the text.
Finally, so unsettling is Wilbur the pig’s melancholy and anxiety that the 
animals who are paired with him in the barn also transition into something a bit 
maddening. And yet hopeful. For they move toward one another and toward what is 
peculiarly human – the expression of self by means of exertion and interconnection 
with others. The animals, ironically, move toward community with one another.
What hangs above all these disruptions and movements, of course, are 
Charlotte’s webs. These are the media by which we are witnessing the motivations 
and the sites of transition. The novelist, hidden as he is in Charlotte’s self-secretions, 
is able to show us examples of reading, of reading into, of transitioning within a 
text that inaugurates and reflects our role as readers.
Let us trace out White’s webs further. Let us take some time to move toward 
the webs themselves. Dr. Dorian wondered aloud to Fern’s mother why everyone 
didn’t see the webs as a miracle, as opposed to the pig. And indeed I agree.
The webs are as much sites and supports for transition as the infant’s interaction 
with the blanket would be for D. W. Winnicott (1971).13 The webs are neither objects 
12 See his introduction where he discusses the relationship to animals as a kind of madness. And then 
this: “nothing will have ever given me more food for thinking through this absolute alterity of the 
neighbor, of the next(-door) than these moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a 
cat” (Derrida 2009: 11).
13 Winnicott’s (1971) descriptions of a transitional object could be paraphrased as follows: with her 
fingers rubbing the corner of her blanket, the infant started to transition toward an outside world
P. Costello: Toward a Phenomenology of Transition
31Libri & Liberi • 2016 • 5 (1):
nor subjects, partaking as they do of both. The webs are spun out of Charlotte’s 
body, out of her own substance, and yet stand on their own. They are temporary, 
being designed to trap insects that will wreck at least major parts of them, and yet 
are so settled as to be permanent in their continuity in the barn. Finally, they are 
designed to be in the background so as not to focus anyone’s attention on them, 
as the blanket, for Winnicott, is designed as a site not to be challenged, if it is to 
provide continuity for the infant’s self-experience.
A word or phrase, however, written in the web changes the very ground of 
our perception of the web. It foregrounds what is not foregrounded. It stabilizes 
what is temporary. It allows to be challenged that which was intended to be in the 
background. And it removes from view the genesis of the site as such, in this case 
the spider and the newsprint or carton from which the words come.
The web as word could not come from excretion or exertion, and certainly not 
from Templeton’s rat-delivered garbage scraps. The web as word is pointing and 
soliciting elsewhere, towards those who read it, towards the means and ends of their 
conscientious, practical lives. The web as word allows others to read themselves into 
its transitional support, and it hides those whose continuity previously depended on 
it. With a word in it, the web hides Charlotte’s body, which would otherwise be laid 
out in the very patterns of sticky thread, like a Jackson Pollock’s painting expresses 
his arm motions in the play of the paint.
In my view, the webs as en-worded are an invitation toward a phenomenological 
reduction, or epoché, of sorts. They announce that experience is always described 
in language. And the very relationship of experience to language is uprooted, 
interrogated, announced. When one does phenomenology, what does one say about 
some experience, about some pig? Even to say “some pig”, as Charlotte does in the 
first religious or salvific web, is frightfully difficult.
“Some” surely does not mean an ordinary pointing out. It carries emotional 
resonance, or it could. And thus the problem begins – how to describe experience in 
such a way as to be honest and truthful about the indeterminacies, inadequacies, and 
in which there were others who always already held viewpoints on her, who shared projects with 
her, as in a family life. The rubbing of the blanket meant a growing capacity to access to the fact 
that she, the infant, did not establish those views, those projects, or that world. And her engagement 
with the blanket as neither object nor subject was her “allowance,” her being on the way toward the 
means to pursue objects and relationships. It was her transitional situation – her self as a process of 
transition – that animated the blanket as a space of relief and growth. The blanket seemed to allow 
her to settle into her patterns of fingering its corner between thumb and forefinger, etc. as if it were 
meant to do so. From the point of view of Winnicott, though, notably, not from that of the infant, the 
noematic clue of the blanket, in other words, allowed her and her parents to come to see the growing 
noetic patterns of her own transitional lived experience.  For a wonderful, insightful treatment of 
transitional objects in relation to children’s literature, please see Kirsten Jacobson’s 2012 article 
entitled “Heidegger, Winnicott, and the Velveteen Rabbit”.
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concealments opened up by the words themselves. To start with a word for the web, 
to start with a word in a web, is to start the problem of how to anticipate and control 
the way others read themselves into the web. It is to have to do phenomenology 
about phenomenology or to consider how to enunciate the problem of what counts 
as the necessary and sufficient language of epistemology.
When Charlotte is going to write “radiant” in her next web, she and Wilbur 
discuss whether or not that is an adequate adjective. Charlotte is not sure it is the 
truth. But Wilbur changes his mode of action and announces that he feels radiant. 
He has made a transition into radiance by means of the word. He has, so to say, read 
himself into the web. And so Charlotte decides to “go to the limit.”
And, indeed, the webs are all about going to the limit. The webs are designed to 
be used in their status as transitional space to make a movement toward something 
else. The webbed words announce for all to see themselves as the possibility 
of moving into the very interstices between act and thought, word and object, 
relationship and individual. The webs also thereby announce a way of bringing 
together a child, her animals, and her adults into a shared situation of transition as 
the motor of development.
In Charlotte’s discussions with Wilbur, the reader is initiated into a number 
of other words that do not get written into webs but are nonetheless generative: 
salutations, gullible, aeronaut, versatile, masterpiece, magnum opus, languishing. 
In discussing what “versatile” means, Charlotte explains to Wilbur that “I can turn 
with ease from one thing to another” (White 2001: 116). This being versatile, this 
ability to make transitions, is something that Dr. Dorian is also certain (and correct) 
will happen to Fern: “I predict that the day will come when even Henry [Fussy] will 
drop some chance remark that catches Fern’s attention. It’s amazing how children 
change from year to year” (111).
Fern, like Charlotte, like Charlotte’s web, like E.B. White, is versatile. Like 
Charlotte and her web, Fern operates at the limits of institutions and projects (like 
the barn, like animal husbandry, like the family) that she has not helped to set 
up. And, like Charlotte, Fern is sedentary, sitting on a stool, and waiting for what 
comes. Has Fern spun all this story out of her own dreams, her own perceptions? 
It is not clear. But someone has. Someone who is as much a teacher as an equal. 
Someone who is as much dependent on children to take on the care of her words, 
her children, as constructive of those children’s care and safety and enjoyment.
Yes, children are transitional, just as their objects are. So are authors. Or 
speakers. If we adults have solidified our viewpoints, that is because, perhaps, 
we have forgotten the genesis of care, of writing, of the way in which childhood 
versatility is the motor of adult moments of stability. How it comes from the “double 
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line” of a web in which words announce and hide themselves, in which “humble” 
means both low to the ground and a lack of arrogance.
The changing, transitional, versatile, attentive child changes because she’s 
attentive. She will pay attention first to spiders and webs. And then to other people. 
As Dr. Dorian remarks: “Children pay better attention than adults” (White 2001: 
110). He works to get her mother to see that it is not Fern who needs help, but the 
family, the mother, whose anxiety is misplaced. Children announce that we must 
return to our own versatility, that our salutations of children indicate in advance our 
own languishing, that we are all low to the ground, waiting for openness to meaning 
that gives us ballast, that makes us aeronauts.
Conclusion
Our daughter, in discussing the end of the book, remarked: “I felt sad that 
Charlotte died but at the same time I felt happy that Wilbur saved her babies and 
was smart enough to do so. I learned you can change even if you don’t want to 
change and when the future comes you will change. Kindness, tenderness, loving is 
the best way to make friends.”
“When the future comes you will change” – the motion of transition for our 
daughter was so thoroughly learned that she saw that it was a matter of inevitability. 
And it was tied to her consciousness of time. To make a transition is what we are 
bound for. We make transitions even if we did not want to. We are the process of 
our time, our lives, our relationships and then have to take them up in the ways that 
they demand. Our transition is for the sake of taking care of ourselves and of those 
with whom we are placed.
With our daughter, I learned, too. I learned again that it is not only that we 
“will change” but that we are changing all the time, by means of the others with 
whom we live. I learned that Wilbur learns, and changes, from Charlotte’s acts. I 
learned to go again and read myself into the text. And there I found, clear as day, 
that Wilbur learns to save and to care and to change from being saved and cared 
for and from witnessing the change in Charlotte that is the gift of their friendship. 
For Charlotte tells him she wrote the words “for you because I liked you” (White 
2001: 164). And because the writing helped “lift up my life a trifle” (164). So, in 
a way, Wilbur learns from Charlotte because they enforce a transitional state upon 
each other.
But do mothers and fathers, do teachers, do adults, feel their children “lift them 
up a trifle”? We ought to. And this I take it is the message of the Philosophy for 
Children curriculum. We can come to see our children as friends that we have unequal 
responsibilities for if we give up unstable, stuck binary categories of adult and child.
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Certainly, with respect to Charlotte and Wilbur, our daughter learned from 
both of them, as friends who dwelled differently yet together. Reading herself into 
Wilbur, childlike in dependence, she learned that change is something which desire 
must reckon with. That tenderness, as bitter as it can be, is a way of navigating it. 
Reading herself into Charlotte, adult in her responsibility, she learned that care is 
instructive of desire, that it moves toward stability and growth.
This motion of “reading into” is a kind of passive synthesis of the order of 
time-consciousness or pairing for Husserl. Becoming ensconced in a novel, or a 
situation, or the world is not willed, but it is nevertheless something for which 
we are responsible. This non-willed responsibility is instructive, and it offers us 
fulfillment, meaning, and danger.
It is my hope that, even with the danger that texts always present, the milk 
stool of childhood’s attentiveness is never empty. It is my hope that children, like 
our daughter, do not read themselves so far into the text so as to imitate Fern who 
becomes “careful to avoid childish things, like sitting on a milk stool near a pigpen” 
(White 2001: 183). For I think attentiveness and study is the childish character of 
phenomenology. We are as much children as adults. And in multiple, shifting ways.
However, if and when the stool is left behind, I hope that the chance words 
dropped by the other people in this world are ones that draw attention and care 
toward some more adequate grasp of the means and ends within the situations in 
which we find ourselves. I hope that children, in short, see each other as both means 
and ends to the process of self-becoming.
Afterthought
As a final note, I would like to point out that it would seem that Fern unites two 
communities in the novel. The first community is that of the animals. To them, Fern 
is just one of them, albeit one who sits on a milk stool. And the animals discuss the 
philosophical problems of animal life (particularly animal life within the context of 
domestication and culinary arts) with Fern there as a witness.
The second community is that of the family, friends, and townspeople with 
whom Fern navigates more actively and with a direct, speaking role. To this second 
community, Fern serves as a moment of transition, as a peculiar sort of motion that 
challenges the stable, non-moving certainties of human experience.
Playing the roles of transition and of intersection, Fern is in a unique space. On 
the one hand, Fern’s involvement with the animals suggests that eidetic structures, 
ideas, are achieved outside of the human world. There is an inquiry that, at best, 
deserves our silence and our limited participation. On the other hand, Fern’s 
involvement with the humans around her suggests that eidetic structures, ideas, 
P. Costello: Toward a Phenomenology of Transition
35Libri & Liberi • 2016 • 5 (1):
are achieved only through rigorous, intersubjective review and challenge. What 
gets revisited, undone, and created are structures of the most basic recognitions of 
human life. These are “up for grabs” with Fern, as is the format of the inquiry itself.
As we leave behind the book, it is difficult to say who is teaching whom. 
Can Fern, can a child, really be said to lead the animals, the adults, and the other 
children to new insights, meaningful insights? It would seem so. On the other hand, 
can this child who is herself an animal, perform that leadership role without the 
unique, active role of animals who are not human, who announce their own struggle 
to inquire into the limits of categorial intuition?
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Prema fenomenologiji  prijelaza: Charlottina mreža E. B. Whitea 
i proces djetetova samoupisivanja u roman
U radu se povezuju fenomenologija i određena vrsta teorije čitateljeva odgovora u pokušaju 
tumačenja poznatoga dječjega romana Charlottina mreža E. B. Whitea. Rad je podijeljen 
na tri dijela: prvi dio razmatra neke od važnijih tema u radu Edmunda Husserla, točnije 
percepciju, intersubjektivnost i temporalnost. Drugi dio opisuje čin autorova  čitanja romana 
s kćeri, postavljajući u prvi plan njezine reakcije na tekst. Treći dio prikazuje novo čitanje 
Whiteove priče nastalo u razgovoru s djetetom te na temelju prethodno predstavljenih 
fenomenoloških koncepata. Nadalje, rad se oslanja na uvide pokreta „filozofije za djecu“ i 
razvoja njegova narativa zajednice istraživanja i propitkivanja.  
Ključne riječi: fenomenologija, teorija čitateljeva odgovora, „filozofija za djecu“, Edmund 
Husserl, E. B. White
Zur Phänomenologie des Übergangs: Charlotte's Web von E. B. 
White und der Prozess des kindlichen Selbsteinschreibens in den 
Roman
Im Beitrag werden Phänomenologie und eine bestimme Art der Reader-Response-Theorie 
zwecks Deutung des Kinderromans Charlotte’s Web von E. B. White verbunden. Der Beitrag 
besteht aus drei Teilen: Im ersten werden einige der wichtigeren Themen im Werk Edmund 
Husserls besprochen, genauer genommen, jene der Perzeption, der Intersubjektivität und 
der Temporalität. Im zweiten Teil wird der Lesevorgang beschrieben, wie der Roman 
seitens des Beitragsautors seiner Tochter vorgelesen wurde, weshalb auch die Reaktionen 
der Tochter in den Vordergrund gerückt werden. Im dritten Teil wird eine neue Lesart von 
Whites Geschichte dargeboten, die ein Ergebnis des Gespräches mit dem Kinde und der im 
Beitrag davor vorgestellten phänomenologischen Konzepte ist. Der Beitrag fußt ferner auf 
den Einsichten der „Philosophie für Kinder“-Bewegung sowie auf der Entwicklung ihres 
Narrativs in Form einer Forschungs- und Hinterfragungsgemeinschaft.  
Schlüsselwörter: Phänomenologie, Reader-Response-Theorie, „Philosophie für Kinder“, 
Edmund Husserl, E. B. White
P. Costello: Toward a Phenomenology of Transition
